This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-way relay network. In this network, two source nodes communicate with each other with the help of an amplify-and-forward relay which may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the sources. For simple investigating the detectability of attacks conducted in Gaussian channels, we focus on the MA channel of the network, while assuming the BC channel is noiseless. Upon such model, we propose a attack detection scheme implemented in the sources. Specifically, we consider a open wireless propagation environment that allows the symbols, forwarded by the relay, to go through a continuous channel and arrive to the sources. With the observations of the source, we develop a detection scheme for the source by comparing the joint empirical distribution of its received and transmitted signals with the known channel statistics. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that if and only if the Gaussian relay network satisfies a nonmanipulable channel condition, the proposed detection scheme can detect arbitrary attacks that allows the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection. Furthermore, we also prove that for the considered Gaussian two-way relay networks, the non-manipulable channel condition is always satisfied. This result indicates that arbitrary attacks conducted in MA Gaussian channels are detectable by only using observations, while providing a base for attack detection in more general Gaussian networks.
in the sense that they are likely to be conducted within continuous alphabet. It is considerable difference with our previous work that are applicable for discrete alphabets [14] - [16] . For the continuous attacks and channel model, the core contribution of this manuscript is to prove that the detectability of continuous attacks is equivalent to non-manipulability of continuous channels. Also, we prove the considered Gaussian channel satisfies the non-manipulable condition. This result indicates that arbitrary attacks conducted in MA Gaussian channels are detectable by only using observations, while providing a base for attack detection in more general Gaussian networks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us focus on the two-way relay example, where the two source nodes are time and phase synchronized. The two source nodes are termed as source 1 and source 2, respectively. The two sources exchange information with each other during two stages. Each stage includes n instant. In the first n instants, source 1 and source 2 respectively sends n-length sequences X n 1 and X n 2 to the relay node. X 1 and X 2 are equiprobability binary symbols generated from alphabet (+1, −1). The MAC channel from the two sources to the relay is specified by U = X 1 + X 2 + N r , where U is the received signal of the relay in each instant, N r is AWGN existed in the MAC channel. Secondly, in the instants n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n, the the relay forwarded V n to the two sources. Through a noiseless broadcast channel, source 1 receives sequence Y exp −x 2 . Upon this assumption, the pdf of U conditioned on X 1 = 1 and X 1 = −1 can be given as exp −x 2 . Then, the CDF of U given X 1 = x 1 is F U|x1 (t |x 1 ) = t −∞ f U|x1 (u |x 1 ) du.
Let us assume X n 1 and X n 2 are i.i.d sequences and both MAC channel and BC channel are memoryless. Hence, U n , N n r are both i.i.d sequences. V n is the forwarded sequences. In this paper, the relay is allowed to conduct arbitrary attack, Then, the stochastic distribution of V n depends on the relay's behavior. In order to define the relay's behavior in mathematic sense, let us choose one n ′ -length sequence u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ′ . Correspondingly, B ( u j ) are domain consisting of u j . They satisfy the constraints as follows. where α 1 and β 1 are assumed to depend on n ′ . We will prove later that there exist a setup method to make α 1 , β 1 and n ′ have the following properties.
Based on the definition of B ( u j ), the continuous variable U can be quantized to discrete U . In particular, if U ∈ B ( u j ),
For the random variable U , we use U to denote its alphabet. Also, we use u i denote the generic symbol over U in the i-th instant. From these notations, the function F
By replacing U and V with their lower cases, the similar definition can be applied to
, which is definite function associated with particular sequence (u n , v n ). If the relay is absolutely reliable, we must always have
From this intuitively understanding, the malicious relay is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Malicious Relay) The relay is said to be non-malicious if
in probability as n and n ′ approach to infinity. Otherwise, the relay is considered malicious.
Note that Definition 1 tolerates manipulating only a negligible fraction of symbols by the relays. This relaxation has essentially no effect on the information rate from the source to the destination across the relays. Definition 1 also tolerates modification conducted by the relay within a negligible extent. This negligible extent is specified by
n ′ −2 → 0, this modification has essentially no effect on the information reliability from the source to the destination across the relay.
For easy description of the main results on detectability, we give the expression of standard the empirical CDF of v n conditioned on x 1 as
By replacing v and x 1 with their upper cases, random F n V n |X n 1 (t |x 1 ) is similarly defined.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We first point that the wireless two-way relay channel is non-manipulable. 
2) For arbitrary value of u,
dt has a strictly positive lower bound.
3) Fix any sufficiently small δ > 0, ǫ > 0, there has sufficiently large n ′ ,
is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small.
2) limn→∞ Pr
D n > µ ′ (n ′ , δ) n ′ −1 j=1 n ′ i=1 |F (n ′ ) V n | U n ( uj | ui )−Φ ( uj − ui) | ≤ δ ≤ ǫ whenever Pr n ′ −1 j=1 n ′ i=1 |F (n ′ ) V n | U n ( uj | ui )− Φ ( uj − ui) | ≤ δ > 0, where µ ′ (n ′ , δ) → 0 as n ′ → ∞, δ → 0.
IV. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let us assume the manipulable wireless channel exists, which indicates there at least one i.i.d attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on X 1 is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X 1 . Hence, we have I (X 1 ; U ) = I (X 1 ; V ), where I (·; ·) denotes mutual information between the two input variables. On the other hand,
It is worth noting that due to the continuity of noise, for arbitrary value of v ∈ (−∞, +∞). both Pr (a < U < b |V = v,
and Pr (a < U < b |V = v, X 1 = +1 ) are well-defined. Furthermore, in this example
can be reshaped as
Since X 1 is independent with X 2 and N , therefore we obtain
which indicates
Similarly, we can have
Submitting (8) and (9) into (5), we get
then, there has
It is not hard to find the two sides of (11) are equivalent to Pr (a + 1 < X 2 + N < b + 1) and
respectively. Finally, we have
In summary, under the assumption that the the channel is manipulable, the equation (12) should be established for arbitrary a and b. In other words, if we can find a pair (a, b) for a wireless channel that Pr (a + 1 < X 2 + N < b + 1) = Pr (a − 1 < X 2 + N < b − 1), then the channel is non-manipulable.
Notice that the system model does not consider the noise of the BC channel. Actually, even consider the noisy BC channel, the wireless network is till non-manipulable. This assertion is proved as follows.
Proposition 2. For random variables
Proof: According to the fact that Z 3 = Z 1 + Z 2 , where Z 1 and Z 2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the characteristic function of Z 3 conditioned on X 1 = x 1 is expressed by
where ϕ Z3|X1 (t |x 1 ), ϕ Z1|X1 (t |x 1 ) and ϕ Z2|X1 (t |x 1 ) denote the characteristic functions of Z 3 , Z 2 and Z 1 conditioned on
Similarly, according to the fact that Z 5 = Z 4 + Z 2 , where Z 4 and Z 2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the characteristic function of Z 5 conditioned on X 1 = x 1 is expressed by
where ϕ Z5|X1 (t |x 1 ) and ϕ Z4|X1 (t |x 1 ) denote the characteristic functions of Z 4 and Z 2 conditioned on X 1 = x 1 , respectively.
Substituting (13) and (14) into (13), we get
Since ϕ Z 2 |X 1 (t |x1 )is characteristic function which always attains strictly non-zero value across t ∈ (−∞, +∞), then we have
From the knowledge that pdf can be uniquely determined by characteristic function, (17) indicates
Let us back to the proof of non-manipulability for the system with noisy BC channels. In such case, the source observes Y = V +N s in the BC phase, where N s denotes the noise of the BC channel. Revisiting Y = V +N s , based on proof firstly given in the section, if and only if the relay is absolutely reliable, i.e., U = V , we can get
consider that Proposition 2 indicates if and only if
We finally get that if and only if U = V , f U +Ns|X 1 (y |x1 ) = f V +Ns|X 1 (y |x1 ) holds true. Hence, we have proved the nonmanipulability of the wireless network having noisy BC channel. The above-mentioned proof indicates our work could be applicable for the wireless network where MA and BC channels are both noisy. For simplicity, we give the detailed proof for the wireless network where only MA channel is noisy.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: PREPARATIONS
In order to prove one convergence property of
given later, we also define
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
If we choose α 1 = −β 1 , and
then upon this setup, besides the statement of (1) is ture, there also exist a upper bound for
This upper bound only depends on n ′ rather than n. Hence, we denote the upper bound as △F max (n ′ ).
where k is a bounded integer.
Proof: To that end, we first reshape F i,i ′ ,j,j ′ as
where the first equality follows X
On the other hand, since
Jointly considering (23) and (24), we have
Following the similar logic from (23) to (25), we also have
Substituting (25) and (26) into (21), we have
and
Then, we proceed to focus on the property of F max (n ′ ). Revisiting the system model, we have
According to P X1|U (1 |u ), P X1|U (−1 |u ) and (19), we get lim n ′ →∞ β1−α1 n ′ −2 = 0. The statement of (1) 
where u
where the last equality follows the fact that the maximum of P ′ X1|U (x 1 |u ) in (−∞, +∞) is bounded and in (19) we have
Hence, for j = 1 and j = n ′ , we have
where the last equality follows in (19) we have lim β1→∞ (2β 1 ) k ξ i (β 1 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Combining (32) and (34), we get for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n ′ ,
Finally, based on the definition of F max (n ′ ) in (28), the statement of this lemma is immediate.
Upon this lemma, we have the following convergence property.
Lemma 2. For arbitrary t, sufficiently small µ and ε
where
Proof: Notice that
The proof of this lemma is equivalent to prove the two items in the right side of (38) both approach to 0. Firstly notice that after n ′ , α 1 and β 1 are chosen and fixed properly,
as n approaches to infinity. Then, focusing on the first item in the right side of (38),
Substituting (40) into the first item in the right side of (38), it becomes
The second item in the right of (41) can be further bound as
where the last equality follows the definition of A ε and set of ε ≤ µ 2n ′ . From (42), the second item in the right of (41) equals to 0. Then, we proceed to bound the first item in the right of (41) as
which follows the Chebyshev theorem. E Aε (·) indicates the expectation of its input conditioned on X n 1 , U n ∈ A ε .
Substituting (44) into (43), we have
From (45) (42) (41) and (38), we have
The proof is finished.
Upon the aforementioned lemmas, the following assertion is immediate. 
2) Fix n ′ to arbitrary large value, and ǫ to arbitrary small value, there has
where n approaches to infinity, lim n ′ →∞ µ n ′ = 0.
Proof: For arbitrary small µ, we have
where the last inequality follows lemma 2. From lemma 1,
for arbitrary value of µ. The first statement of this lemma is proved. Furthermore, according to the expression of Θ (µ, n, n ′ ), Θ (µ, n, n ′ ) < ǫ would be yielded by
n → ∞, ǫ 1 < ǫ. Hence, by setting
the second statement can be proved.
Lemma 4.
There exist n 0 , by which for arbitrary n ′ > n 0 we have sequence
Proof: Let us choose t i = u j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n ′ − 1. Then, the proof follows the logic of the proof that wireless channel is non-manipulable.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us go back to the proof of theorem 1. With the aforementioned lemmas, we will show the decision statistic
f U|X1 (u |x 1 ) du simultaneously satisfies the properties stated by theorem 1.
From aforementioned work, it is not hard to find many variables, such as α 1 , β 1 and u, depend on n ′ . For easy description, n ′ does not appear in these notations. However, the dependency between n ′ and these variables will be utilized in the proof given below. Hence, these notations are written with a superscript n ′ or possible value of n ′ so as to highlight the dependency on n ′ . To be more specific, n ′ takes value from sequence n
Proof: Using the assertion given by lemma 4, the proof of this lemma follows our previous work.
Lemma 6.
If the wireless channel is non-manipulable, then for arbitrary small δ, there exist sufficient large n 0 , such that for
Proof: First notice that for arbitrary W
Then, according to the condition that
For the sake of proof, we define a function set
Then, we define D
Obviously,
However, (61) indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (α ′ , β ′ ) making (62) be true. Hence, the contradiction happens. Due to these contradictions, we attain the assumption that for arbitrary large n
Applying the aforementioned derivation to each function belonging to F , we get there exist n 0 , for any n
is available for all possible functions of F . Since λ
Finally, the proof is completed.
Lemma 7.
Fixing arbitrary small ǫ and δ, if there exist n ′ 0 such that
where n → ∞, n ′ is sufficient large so as to satisfy the properties given by lemma 4 and lemma 6. ε (n ′ , δ) is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small value.
Proof: According to lemma 3, there exist µ n ′ such that
where µ n ′ → 0 as n ′ → ∞, n → ∞. The last inequality follows the fact that
we must have
On the other hand, if
> δ, according to lemma 5, the right side of (66)
which can be reshaped as
, according to lemma 6, ε (n ′ , δ) > 0 as n ′ is sufficient large. From the properties of µ n ′ and
Upon (66), (67) and (68), we have
where the equation follows the logic from (66), (67) to (68). Then, we have
where the last inequality follows (65). The proof is finished.
The first property of theorem 1 is direct result from lemma 7.
We proceed to prove the second property of theorem 1. For arbitrary small δ, µ and µ ′ (n ′ , δ) = µ + δ n ′ −2 , we have
where the equality firstly follows the fact that according to t V n | U n (t |u ),
− u ≤ δ, combining with another event
we have
Hence, the equality in (70) is established. Upon (70) and lemma 3, the property 2 in theorem 1 is direct.
